Business cycle and monetary policy in Romania

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I. Macroeconomic overview

Before the crisis

- Rapid GDP growth in 2001-2008 (6.5% average annual growth) fuelled by large capital inflows:
 - ✓ A real-estate and consumption boom emerged as wage and credit were increasing rapidly
 - ✓ An expansionary fiscal policy further contributed to the overheating of the economy starting in 2005
- Large imbalances were building up, rendering the economy vulnerable to negative shocks
 - ✓ Unsustainable structural fiscal imbalances doomed Romania to fiscal consolidation when the crisis hit
 - ✓ Sizeable external disequilibrium (the current account deficit peaked at 13.4% of GDP in 2007)
 - ✓ External debt increased from euro bn. 30.9 in 2005 to euro bn. 72.4 in 2008

Adjustments in the wake of the crisis

- The current account deficit plunged to sustainable levels (4.4% of GDP in 2012, 0.4% of GDP in 2014)
- Sharp fiscal consolidation brought the deficit from 9% of GDP in 2009 to 1.5% of GDP in 2014
- The public debt-to-GDP ratio increased rapidly during the crisis, but it is still one of the lowest in the EU and is estimated to stabilize below 40% of GDP over the medium term
- Total external debt increased to euro bn. 100 in 2012 and decreased to euro bn. 63 in 2014.

Outlook for 2015 and beyond

- Expected economic outcomes in 2015 if fiscal plans receive approval:
 - ✓ GDP growth estimated at 4.4% in 2015 and 4.1% in 2016 (beyond potential in both cases)
 - ✓ O-Y-A inflation estimated at 0.2% in December 2015 and 0.7% in December 2016. Annual average inflation of -0.2% in 2015 and -0.8% in 2016
 - ✓ The CA deficit, expected to deepen to -1.5 percent of GDP
 - ✓ Budget deficit moves at 4 percent in 2016 and 5 percent in 2017 if both the Fiscal Code and the wage bill are approved
- Weakened macroeconomic fundamentals would not support strong growth and would lead to further delayes in joining the Banking Union and the euro area

II. Economic freedom and real convergence

EU economies became more liberal in 2014 as compared to 1996 (see detailed charts at the end of the presentation)



EU countries migrate to upper clusters as regards property freedom. Slow progress for Romania

Romania has made little progress until

2014; Italy and Greece show regression

Unclear property rights in Romania in 1996



1996

Some developed countries have lost part of their freedom from corruption

Greece and Italy have the lowest freedom

from corruption in 2014 among EA Romania was among countries with the lowest freedom from corruption in 1996 countries 1996 2014 180 180 GDP at current prices per hour GDP at current prices per hour Source: author's computations; 160 Source: author's computations; 160 AMECO; Heritage Foundation 15=100EU15=100) AMECO; Heritage Foundation 140 140 DF 120 120 DE EU IT 100 100 IT (PPS, worked (PPS, 80 80 GR GR 60 60 worked CZ PO 40 40 PO RO 20 20 RO 0 0 20 70 80 90 100 30 50 60 40 70 80 90 100 20 30 60 50 **4**0 Freedom from corruption **Freedom from corruption**

Gross domestic product at current prices per hour worked (PPS, EU15=100): Change in positions (index)



Gross domestic product at current prices per hour worked (PPS, EU15=100)



Romania`s scoreboard indicators in 2013

- Public debt: 37.9 % of GDP
- Curent account (CA) deficit (average over the past 3 years): 1.9 % of GDP
- Net international investment position: (-61.5 %) of GDP
- **Real effective exchange rate** (percentage change over the past 3 years): 0.3
- Market share of exports of goods and services (percentage change over the last 5 years): 16.4
- Unit labor cost (percentage change over the past 3 years): 0.7
- Houses price index (annual percentage change): -4.6
- Private sector debt: 66.4 % of GDP
- Credit flow to the private sector: -1.5 % of GDP
- Unemployment rate: 7 %
- Financial sector total liability (annual change): 3.1 %

Romania's indices of economic freedom for 2015 compare well to those of Germany, except for property rights, freedom from corruption, and financial freedom

Indicator		Romania (66.6	6; ranks 57) 🤆	Germany (73.8; ranks 16)		
•	Property Rights (RoL)		(40.0 ~)	90.0 ~		
•	Freedom From Corrup	tion (RoL)	43.0+	78.0 -		
•	Business Freedom (RE)	69.8 -	88.2 -		
•	Labor Freedom (RE)		68.6 +	51.2 +		
•	Monetary Freedom (R	E)	77.3 +	81.5 +		
•	Government Spending	g (LG)	62.3 +	40.1 +		
•	Fiscal Freedom (LG)		86.9 -	60.8 -		
•	Trade Freedom (OM)		88.0 +	88.0 +		
•	Investment Freedom (OM)	80.0 ~	90.0 ~		
•	Financial Freedom (Of	VI)	50.0~	70.0 ~		
Source: Heritage Foundation						

RoL=rule of law; **RE**=regulatory efficiency; **LG**=low government; **OM**=open markets; - indicates a decrease as compared to the previous year; + indicates an increase as compared to the previous year; ~ = stable

III. GDP dynamics and its features

ROMANIA: Annual GDP growth rates (%)



-20 Global recession of 1991

Romania's GDP growth: some features

➢ High dependency on capital inflows

- > Three distinctive periods of positive growth:
 - ✓ The financial repression period: 1990-1996
 - The boom period: 2000-2008 (high capital inflows fuelled high growth)
 - The "free" growth period (no implicit subsidies, no high capital inflows): 2011-until now. GDP growth averaged 2 percent a year

In Romania, GDP growth depends on capital inflows (%) (Source: NIS and author`s calculations)

	Average	Cumulated growth over						
Period	growth rate	the period	Comments					
			low private capital					
1990-1992	-10.7	-27.8*	inflows					
			low private capital					
1993-1996	4.08	17.2	inflows					
			low private capital					
1997-1999	-2.4	-7.2	inflows					
			MODERATE PRIVATE					
2000-2004	5.4	29.8**	CAPITAL INFLOWS					
			HIGH PRIVATE CAPITAL					
2005-2008	6.9	30.6	INFLOWS					
			high public external					
2009-2010	-4.0	-7.9	borrowings					
2011-			low private capital					
2014***	2.0	8.3	inflows					
* 3 years; ** 5 years; ***growth for 2014 estimated at 2.9 percent Lucian Croitoru								

IV. The fiscal deficit and the cycle

Procyclical fiscal policy before and after the 2008 crisis



Cumulated percentage growth of wages, labor productivity (2000=100), and public pensions (2001=100)



Public debt as a percent of GDP in the EU in 2014. Romania has a enviable position



Changes in public debt in the EU from 2007 to 2014 (percentage points). Significant upward adjustment in the case of Romania, but low by comparison to other countries



Changes in cyclically adjusted GG balances (percentage points): Roamania performed the second largest adjustment ("-" means a increase in the fiscal deficit)



Cyclically adjusted GG balances: Romania compared badly to other EU countries before 2008 and compares well prezently. Adjustments made in 2010 were key to reaching the present good positin



Cyclical fiscal balance in EU countries (% of GDP). Almost each country was imprudently enjoying good times



V. The current account

Significant changes in current account balances (percentage points). "-" indicates a reduction in the CA deficit

Current account balances in EU countries (% of GDP)

In Romania, the current account was mostly financed by debt creation during the boom phase of the cycle (EUR bn.)

Reserve assets (- increase/+ decrease)

- Other accounts receivable/payable
- - CURRENT ACCOUNT DEFICIT

Romania: the current account deficit was mostly ascribable to the private sector external deficit during the boom (% of GDP)

8 Decreasing investment during 6.7 recession 6 Higher investment without much progress in 4.3 infrastructure 4 3.4 2.8 2 0 -2 -2.9 Source: author's estimation based on data from EUROSTAT, NBR and UNCTAD -4 ~1995~1996~1991~1998~1999~1000 1001 1002 1003 200° 200° 200° 2001 200° 2009 2010 2012 2012 2012 Investment savings

Romania: public savings and investment (% of GDP)

Romania: the private sector reduced savings and increased investment during the boom and reduced them both in the aftermath (% of GDP)

VI. Inflation developments

A few features of the HICP consumer basket in Romania

- 32 percent of consumer bascket are given by food and volatile prices
- Had the NBR chosen the core inflation to be targeted, it would have been difficult for the public to understand the concept
- By choosing the headline inflation to be targeted, the NBR exposed itself to the reputational risk of missing the target because of high volatility of too many prices

The share of food items in the HICP consumer basket, 2015

Source: Eurostat

Romania: the share of food items in the consumer basket

Source: NIS

Note: Variation band of the target is ±1 percentage point.

Source: NIS, NBR

VII. Monetary policy

Five distinct periods of inflation deviation from the target prior to the downturn

- 1. The period up to the closing of the output gap (2003 Q1-2004 Q2);
- 2. The following period up to the adoption of inflation targeting (2004 Q3-2005 Q3);
- 3. The period between the shift to inflation targeting and the surge in capital inflows (2005 Q4-2006 Q3);
- 4. The period of massive capital inflows, up to the outbreak of the global crisis (2006 Q4-2007 Q3);
- 5. The period between the global crisis setting in until the domestic economy entered recession (2007 Q4-2008 Q3), when the contribution of CORE3 inflation to the deviation of CPI inflation from the target was positive and relatively high for the first time.

Measures aimed at taming capital inflows before downturn in 2008 Q4. Did they work? NO! (I)

- Capital account liberalization (March 2003; last stage Sep.2006)
- Introduction of restrictions on mortgage lending (February 2004)
- Stricter eligibility criteria for consumer loans (February 2004)
- ➤ Larger exposures to one debtor from 20% to 25% (July 2004))
- ➤ MRR on fx liabilities, from 25% to 30% (August 2004)
- ➤ MRR lei from 18% to 16% (August 2005)
- ➤ MRR on fx liabilities from 30% to 35% (January 2006)
- ➤ MRR on fx liabilities from 35% to 40% (March 2006)
- ➤ MRR lei, from 16% to 20% (July 2006)

Measures aimed at taming capital inflows before downturn in 2008 Q4. Did they work? NO! (II)

- Stricter criteria for household lending (LTV and Debt Service To Income)
- ➢ Forex exposures limited to three times own funds (September 2005)
- Unhedged borrowers (natural persons) cannot be classified into the top grade (A) of financial performance (October 2005)
- Regulation and supervision of non-bank financial institutions (February 2006)
- ➢ Higher capital requirements since January 2007
- Stricter eligibility criteria for the components of own funds (January 2007)
- ► Loosening of credit standards for lending to households (March 2007)
- Stricter provisioning requirements for loans to unhedged borrowers (natural persons) (March 2008)
- Exclusion of intermediate profit from own funds calculation (August 2008)
- Adjustment of max DTI within internal procedures approved by the NBR (August 2008)

High annual credit growth rates in Romania indicating huge private capital inflows in 2004-2008 (%)

—Total credit (nominal growth rate)

-Total credit (growth rate adjusted for FX variation and inflation)

—FX loans (growth rate adjusted for FX variation and inflation)

Faced with high capital inflows, the NBR increased minimum reserve requirements (MRR) in Romania (%). When the crisis hit Romania, the NBR reduced the MRR

A policy interest rate dilemma emerged late in 2006: should the NBR increase the interest rate to curb inflation or lower it to tame capital inflows?

- CPI annual inflation (%)
- Annual GDP gap (%)

— Nominal leu/euro exchange rate (quarterly average, rhs)

--- Annual inflation target (rhs)

An explanation for the criticism that the central bank did not increase the policy rate more aggressively prior to the downturn

$$\pi_t = \beta E_t \{ \pi_{t+1} \} + k x_{2_t} \tag{1}$$

Implications of equation (1) in theory:

- (i) inflation should return to its target level relatively fast. There is no impact on growth from sharp moves in the interest rate
- deviations from the inflation target due to supply-side shocks should not be accepted. Supply shocks are working via natural output
- (iii) monetary policy has no reason to be concerned over the impact of changes in asset prices (including in the exchange rate) on the competitiveness of the economy or on financial stability

This idea prevailed in theory until mid-2000, and in Romania it still prevails or at least prevailed until recently.

Critics were ignoring:

- "Distortion"-type shocks in the supply equation, such as variations in taxation rates, changes in markups pursued by firms or "cost-push shocks" (Clarida, Galí and Gertler, 2001; Smets and Wouters, 2003; Benigno and Woodford, 2003 and 2005; Woodford and Cúrdia, 2009)
- Endogenous responses (fluctuations) of the output gap to shocks (Erceg, Henderson and Levin, 2000)
- Endogenous responses of the gap between the natural level and the efficient level of output to supply-side shocks and to preference shocks (Blanchard and Galí, 2007 and 2008)
- Financial frictions, the banking sector (Bernanke, Gertler, Gilchrist, 1998; Woodford and Curdia, 2009) and real wage rigitities (Christiano et al., 2011)

The contribution to inflation of demand-pull inflation became positive in 2007 Q4-2008 Q3

Period	Deviation of annual CPI inflation (pp)	Contribut ion of non- CORE3 inflation (pp)	Contribut ion of CORE3 inflation (pp)	Real monetary policy rate (%)	Real monetary policy rate gap (%)	Real effective monetary policy rate gap (%)
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
2005 Q4-2007 Q3	0.25	1.58	-1.33	1.78	-0.57	-1.24
2007 Q4-2008 Q3	3.95	2.39	1.56	3.20	0.69	0.42

Table 1: The contributions of non-CORE3 inflation and CORE3 inflation to the deviation of annual CPI inflation from the target and the real monetary policy rate

Source: Macroeconomic Modelling and Forecasting Department, NBR's quarterly forecasting model, and the author's calculations.

"Unconventional" monetary policy in the immediate aftermath of the crisis

Prudential measures implemented during October 2008-December 2012. Will they work? I doubt! (I)

- ➤ MRR ratio on lei liabilities, from 20% to 18% (November 2008)
- Reduction of loan loss provisions by considering max 25% of collateral in case of loans classified as Loss 2 (April 2009)
- Introduction of audited intermediate profit within own funds calculation (May 2009)
- ➢ Introduction of the "First Home" program (June 2009)
- MRR ratio on lei liabilities, from 18% to15%; MRR ratio on fx liabilities, from 40% to 35% (July 2009)
- Balance-sheet current accounts at accounting value instead of adjusted value (July 2009)
- ➤ MRR ratio on fx liabilities, from 35% to 30% (August 2009)

Prudential measures implemented during October 2008-December 2012. Will they work? I doubt! (II)

- ▶ MRR on fx liabilities from 30% to 25% (Nov. 2009)
- Improvements to the regulatory framework on managing liquidity risk (Dec. 2009)
- Government Emergency Ordinance 50/2010 on consumer lending (June 2010). Removes abusive clauses from loan contracts
- ▶ MRR on fx liabilities, from 25% to 20% (Apr. 2011)
- Limits on exposures to unhedged borrowers; higher coefficients for stresstesting fx loans (Oct. 2011)
- ➢ From Romanian Accounting Standards to IFRS adoption (Jan. 2012)
- Improvements to the regulatory framework on managing liquidity risk (Jan. 2012)
- Banks' aggregate exposure limits vis-à-vis unhedged non-financial companies (Dec. 2012)

Higher inflation delayed the start of the policy rate-cutting cycle in Romania

Annual inflation rate

Policy interest rates

Interest rates on newly-extended loans decrease

VIII. Is a new monetary policy rate dilemma emerging?

The hypothesis of secondarity and implications for monetary policy in Romania

- Secondarity: the global surplus of savings is generated in an increasing number of countries, whereas the overwhelming part of the global deficit of savings is located in the US (Croitoru, 2015b and 2015d)
- The US are far better equipped to accommodate swift capital outflows, currency depreciation, an abrupt decline in domestic asset prices, banking system weakening, and the flagging domestic demand

Illustrated secondarity: the history of savingsinvestment imbalances across major countries and regions (USD mill., current prices)

The Romanian conundrum (I)

- The current account deficit plunged from 4.5 percent of GDP in 2012 to 0.4 percent of GDP in 2014
- GDP growth accelerated over that period
- How was it possible?
 - One of the implications of shifting to excess savings is the reduction in the natural rate of interest. *Mutatis mutandis*, the plunge in the current account deficit in Romania to almost zero was reflected in the lower natural rate of interest
 - The swift narrowing of the savings deficit suggests that the natural rate has declined at a quick pace as well

Inflation: a downward path, largely reflecting the fall in inflation expectations. Hence, the NBR cut the monetary policy rate from 5.25 percent in December 2012 to 1.75 percent in May 2015

Thus, it is possible that, during 2013, 2014 and 2015, the nosedive of the current account deficit, the monetary policy rate cuts and liquidity management may have resulted in the money market rate running below the natural rate

A new policy dilemma?

- Actual growth rates above potential will, probably, close the GDP gap in 2016
- GDP growth rates above potential and low global interest rates will pose again a dilemma to monetary policy in Romania (Croitoru, 2015c):
 - ✓ A higher policy rate would be needed to tame inflationary pressure from the positive GDP gap
 - ✓ A lower policy rate would be needed to avoid the leu appreciation
- If a current account surplus emerged, as the secondarity suggests, the policy rate dilemma would not appear
- However, the new Fiscal Code based on tax cuts together with wage increases up to 70 percent would lead to fiscal deficits of 4-5 percent in 2016 and 2017, eliminating the issue of the interest rate dilemma, but creating other serious problems to the macroeconomic stability of Romania

Thank you!

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Fig.1: Labor productivity and the general index of economic freedom in 1996

Fig. 2: Labor productivity and the general index of economic freedom in 2014

Fig. 3: Labor productivity and property freedom in 1996

Fig.4: Labor productivity and property freedom in 2014

Fig. 5: Labor productivity and freedom from corruption in 1996

Fig. 6: Labor productivity and freedom from corruption in 2014

Financing of the current account: mostly from the financial account (bn. EUR)

